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Underdetermined Interests: Scientific 'Goods' and Animal Welfare
Abstract
It is well known that the culture within which actors such as scientists and clinicians operate is structured
by the mechanisms through which institutional rewards are distributed (Garfield 1979). In the biosciences,
citation counts are the accepted markers of a researcher's originality and competence that permit access
to funding, promotion and other forms of institutional support. Osborne and colleagues' (2009) study
suggests that beneath this publication-driven reward system is a widespread indifference on the part of
journals to the ethical/welfare issues that surround the use of animals for the purposes of science.
Although the promotion of animal welfare is not necessarily a goal of the vast majority of scientific
research, it is arguable that those who distribute the institutional rewards should also be accountable for
the harms that occur during efforts directed at their attainment.
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It is well known that the culture within which actors such as scientists and clinicians operate is
structured by the mechanisms through which institutional rewards are distributed (Garfield 1979). In
the biosciences, citation counts are the accepted markers of a researcher's originality and
competence that permit access to funding, promotion and other forms of institutional support.
Osborne and colleagues' (2009) study suggests that beneath this publication-driven reward system is
a widespread indifference on the part of journals to the ethical/welfare issues that surround the use
of animals for the purposes of science. Although the promotion of animal welfare is not necessarily a
goal of the vast majority of scientific research, it is arguable that those who distribute the
institutional rewards should also be accountable for the harms that occur during efforts directed at
their attainment. Other studies of the effects of the dictum “publish or perish” on medicine and
sciences such as psychology and ecology indicate that within this professional structure of reward
through publication, editorial policies are one of the few levers that can rapidly affect a wholesale
change to research practices (Fidler et al. 2004). Consequently the move to assign some
responsibility to journals for the maintenance and promotion of animal welfare is a simple but
significant step that could change the way the biosciences utilize non-human animals. Although we
heartily commend Osborne and colleagues (2009) because their study should provoke some
worthwhile ideas and their proposal has a great deal of merit, we believe that any change to
editorial policies could, and in fact should, be extended to address other concerns beyond improving
animal welfare. Our position is that any editorial prescription for what constitutes ‘good’ animalbased science should also ensure that scientists are aware that the ethical permissibility of their
research depends in part on the purpose for which it is undertaken, and the just distribution of any
benefits.
While we understand that the empirical focus of Osborne and colleagues' (2009) research limits the
types of recommendations that can be made, we believe that any changes to editorial policies
should do more to promote the interests of the animal participants than implementation of the 3Rs.
The nub of our disagreement with Osborne and colleagues' recommendations rests on the
recognition that moral philosophy and animal-welfare science have adopted similar approaches to
animal-use in scientific and biomedical experimentation, yet come to different conclusions. This
division can be best described as the difference between a focus on the ‘rights’ and a focus on the
‘needs’ of the experimental subject (Fraser 1999). While the move to acknowledge that animals have
‘interests’ has been the basis for the late–20th century reconceptualization of many approaches to
the moral status of individual animals, proponents of a science of ‘welfare’ have not been bothered
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with the larger metaphysical questions of how we ‘ought’ to behave towards other animals. They
have concentrated on refining the description and further adaptation of research practices as being
‘better’ or ‘worse’ at accommodating the needs of these animals. Consequently it is arguable that
welfare-based approaches such as the 3Rs consistently underdetermine the interests of the subject
of any experiments because they generally valorise the measurement of the relative conditions in
which the animal is kept over any assessment of the potential utility of the knowledge produced for
humankind or other animals (Broom 1991). Unfortunately from this perspective what is considered
to be ‘good’ science then becomes a question of harm minimization rather than also providing an
assessment of the likely utility or epistemic validity of individual experiments. In his writings on this
subject, Bernard Rollin—one of the founders of the welfare-based approach to animal use—has
consistently restated the point that science is not a ‘value-free’ enterprise. What Rollin (2006) means
in this context is that sometimes epistemological and ethical issues cannot be clearly separated.
While we understand that a pragmatic approach to animal-use focused on welfare is most likely to
rapidly improve the lives of experimental animals, developments in the field of translational
medicine indicate that perhaps the time for avoiding the larger issue has ended.
The inability of the 3Rs to address the conflation of ethical and epistemological issues is most clearly
evident in biomedicine where the continual failure of extrapolation or ‘translation’ of knowledge to
humans has led to repeated calls for animal-based trials to be subjected to similar forms of
experimental control and analysis as other types of medical evidence (Hackam 2007). A partial
solution might be to reorganize our methods for addressing larger research questions. There are
alternate comparative research strategies that come closer to reflecting more of the interests of the
experimental subjects while still providing epistemic benefits. It has been argued that the
prioritization of patient-focused research combined with the investigation of analogous spontaneous
animal diseases is a methodology that is far more likely to provide fruitful models of human
dysfunction and pathologies than current biomedical methods (Marincola 2003). As a consequence
of this type of research there are now programs where animal patients are trialling potential human
therapies—such as autologous stem cells for osteoarthritis and new treatments for some forms of
canine lymphoma. If we look to species interest rather than individual interest, a very different idea
emerges of how we should act. While the appropriation of ‘diseased’ rather than healthy animals for
medical research may not always promote the interests of the bearer, under the utilitarian
framework commonly used to justify these practices it does seem more likely that at least animals of
the same species might gain some benefit from this type of research, answering some of the
concerns regarding justice in distribution. For us the notion of ‘good’ in welfare-based approaches is
too narrow. It is focused on the idea of the good treatment of animals, not good in the sense of
sound or valid science. It also appears to be a conception of good that does little to promote more
than the most basic interests of the animals involved in scientific practices.
Hence, it is arguable that to continue to unreflectively emphasize a focus on ‘welfare’ in the ethical
renegotiation of animal experimentation fails to address many of the issues that complicate the
necessity and validity (and therefore the ethical permissibility) of these scientific investigations.
What is required—at a minimum—is that a further criteria of ‘relevance’ needs to be added to the
3Rs to force researchers to substantiate the ethical grounds for undertaking each experiment. Even
if the issues that surround the extrapolation of animal-based scientific knowledge to humans remain
unresolved, and therefore open to dispute, it is possible that within this extended framework
ethically and epistemically ‘good’ science can be nudged even closer to becoming a conjoined
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enterprise (Shanks et al. 2009; Steel 2008). Examples of how this could be achieved can be found in
medical journals that already demand strict ethical standards. The editorial guidelines for the Lancet
and the BMJ for instance require that in each original submission the authors clearly articulate their
principle finding; the strengths and weaknesses of the study and its relation to other similar work;
and the meaning of the study and its possible implications for other practitioners and policymakers.
Although not all animal-based research has a clear application it does not seem unreasonable for
authors publishing in the biosciences to clearly state and justify the significance and stated goals of
their animal-based investigation, particularly in those cases where the ethical permissibility of the
research in some way rests on the potential utility of the findings. Whilst consensus on whether we
‘ought’ to be conducting this type of research remains out of reach, combining concerns for animal
welfare with a range of editorial measures that force authors to clearly state the context, broader
significance and likely beneficiaries of their study should provide other species with further
protection against unnecessary publication-driven research programs. Our preference would be for
the simultaneous valorisation of research methodologies that in some way also reflect a broader
conception of the interests of the animal subjects.
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